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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a simple model of market equilibrium
to explain why firms that maximize the value of their shares
pay dividends even though the funds could instead be retained
and subsequently distributed to shareholders in a way that would
allow them to be taxed more favorably as capital gains. The
two principal ingredients of our explanation are:(1) the cion-
flicting preferences of shareholders in different tax brackets
and (2) the shareholders' desire for portfolio diversification,
we show that companies will pay a positive fraction of earnings
in dividends. We also provide some comparative static analysis
of dividend behavior with respect to tax parameters and to the
conditions determining the riskiness of the securities.
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The nearly universal policy of paying substantial dividends
is the primary puzzle in the economics of corporate finance.
Dividends are taxed at rates varying up to 70 percent and averaging
nearly 40 percent for individual shareholders. In contrast,
retained earnings imply no concurrent tax liability; the rise in
the share value that results from retained earnings is taxed only
when the stock is sold and then at least 60 percent of the gaix is
untaxed.1 In spite of this significant tax penalty, U.S. corpora-
tions continue to distribute a major fraction of their earnings as
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1Current law allows 60 percent of the gain to be excluded.
This has the effect of taxing realized capital gains at only 40
percent of the regular income tax rate. When shares that are
obtained as a bequest are sold, the resulting taxable income is
limited to 40 percent of the rise in the value of the shares since
the death of the previous owner.
(111979)2
dividends; durin9 the past 15 years, dividends have averaged 45
percent of real after-tax profits. In effect, corporations volun-
tarily impose a tax liability on their shareholders that is
currently more than $10 billion a year.1
Why do corporations not eliminate (or sharply reduce) their
dividends and increase their retained earnings?2 It is, of course,
arguable that if all firms were to adopt such a policy it would
raise the a9gregate level of investment and therefore depress the
rate of return on capital.3 But any individual firm could now
increase its retained earnings without having to take less than
'There would of course be no problem in explaining the exis-
tence of dividends if there were no taxes. The analysis of
Modigliani and Miller (1958) shows that without taxes dividend
policy is essentially irrelevant since shareholders can in prin-
ciple offset any change in dividend policy by buying or sellinq
shares. Even in the Modigliani-Miller world, the stability of
dividend rates would require explanation.
2There is also in principle the possibility of repurchasing
shares instead of paying dividends. The proceeds received by
shareholders would be taxed at no more than the capital gains rate
and therefore at no more than 40 percent of the rate that would
be paid if the same funds were distributed as dividends. There
are however significant legal impediments to a systematic repur-
chase policy. Regular periodic repurchases of shares would be
construed as equivalent to dividends for tax purposes. Sporadic
repurchases would presumably avoid this but would subject managers
and directors to the risk of shareholder suits on the grounds that
they benefited from insider knowledge in deciding when the company
should repurchase shares and whether they as individuals should
sell at that time. British law orbids the repurchase of shares.
The present paper assumes that frequent repurchases would be
regarded as income and therefore focuses on the choice between
dividends and retained earnings, The possibility of postponed
and infrequent share repurchases is expressly considered.
3The greater retained earnings could also partly or wholly
replace debt finance.3
the average market return on its capital if it used the additional
funds to diversify into new activities or even to acquire new
firms.
Several different possible resolutions of the dividend
puzzle have been suggested. In reality there is probably some
truth to all oe these ideas but we believe that, even collectively,
they have failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of the
prevailing ratio of dividends to retained earnings. It is useful
to distinguish five kinds of explanations.
First, there is the desire on the part of small investors,
fiduciaries and nonprofit organizations for a steady stream of
dividends with which to finance consumption. Although the same
consumption stream might be financed on a more favorably taxed
basis by periodically selling shares, it is argued that small
investors might have substantial transaction costs and that some
fiduciaries and nonprofit organizations are required to spend
only "income" and not "principal." However, transaction costs
could be reduced significantly if investors sold shares less
frequently. Fiduciaries and nonprofit organizations can often
eliminate any required distinction between income and principal.
Merton Miller and Myron Scholes (1978) have offered the ingen-
ious explanation that the current limit on interest deductions
implies that there is no marginal tax on diyidends, Under current
tax law, an individual's deduction for investment interest (ie.,
interest other than mortgage and business interest) is limited to
investment income plus $25,000. An extra dollar of dividend income4
raises the allowable interest deduction by one dollar, For a
taxpayer for whom this constraint is binding, the extra dollar of
dividends is just offset by the extra dollar of interest deduction,
leaving taxable income unchanged. Although Miller and Scholes
discuss how the use of tax-exempt annuities "should" make this
constraint binding for all individual investors, in reality fewer
than one-tenth of one percent of taxpayers with dividends actually
had large enough interest deductions to make this consttaint
binding. Moreover, since the limit on interest deductions was
only introduced in 1969, the Miller and Scholes thesis is irrele—
vant for earlier years.
A more plausible explanation is that dividends are required
because of the separation of ownership and management. According
to one form of this argument, dividends are a signal of the sus-
tamable income of the corporation: management selects a dividend
policy to communicate the level and growth of real income because
conventional accounting reports are inadequate guides to cuent
income and future prospects.2 While this theory remains to be
fully elaborated, it does suggest that the steadiness (or safety)
of the dividend, as well as its average level, might be used in a
dynamic setting. The dividend tax of more than $10 billion does
1The NBER TAXSIM model, usin individual income tax returns
for 1975, indicates that of 13 iillion returns with dividends
totalling$23.2 billion, the interest deduction constraint was
binding for about 50 thousand.
2For a developmentof this view, see Bhattacharya (1979),
Gordon and Malkiel (1979) and Ross (1977)5
seem to be an inordinately high price to pay for communicating
this information; a lower payment ratio would convey nearly the
dame information without such a tax penalty. Closely related to
the signalling idea is the notion that shareholders distrust the
management and fear that retained earnings will be wasted in poor
investments, higher management compensation, etc. According to
this argument, in the absence of taxation shareholders would clearly
prefer "a bird in hand" and this preference is strong enough to
pressure management to make dividend payments even when this
involves a tax penalty. If investors would prefer dividends to
retained earnings because of this distrust, it is hard to under-
stand why there is not pressure for a 100 percent dividend payout.1
Alan Auerbach (1979), David Bradford (1979) and Mervyn King
(1977) have developed a theory in which positive dividend payments
are consistent with shareholder equilibrium because the market
value per dollar of retained earnings is less than one dollar.
More specifibälly, if S is the tax rate on dividends andis the
equivalent accrual tax rate on capital gains,2 the net value of
one dollar of dividends is 1 -O while the net value of one dollar
'The argument that dividends reflect the separation of owner-
ship and management appears to be supported by the fact that closely
held companies pay little or no dividends. However, such companies
can usually achieve a distribution of funds as management salary
which is deductible.
2The equivalent accrual tax rate on capitalgains is the
present value of the tax liability that will eventually be paid,
per dollar of dividend income.6
of retained, earnings is (l-c)p where p is the ride in the market
value of the firm's shares when an extra dollar of earnings js
retained, i.e., p is the share price per dollar of equity capital..
Auerbach, Bradford and King point out that shareholders will be
indifferent between dividends and retained earnings if the share
price per dollar of equity capital is p =(,l—O)/(l—c)<1.At
any other value of p, shareholders would prefer either no divi-
dends or no retained earnings but at p =(l—O)/(l--c)any value of
the dividend payout rate would be equally acceptable. Moreover,
in the context of their model, the share price will satisfy this
value of q when shares sell at. the present value of after-tax divi-
dends. In short. they argue that the existence of dividends is
appropriate if the value of retained earnings capitalizes the tax
penalty on any eventual distribution.
This line of reasoning is clearly important but raises
several problems. First, it has been argued1 that an equilibrium
in which p is less than one is incompatible with new equity finance
by the firm. While it is clearly inconsistent for firms to pay
dividends and sell shares at the same time (except if dividends are
paid for some of the other reasons noted.above), the theory is not
incompatible with firms having some periods when p1 and new
equity is sld and other periods when p1 and dividends are paid
but shares are not sold. In any case, new equity issues by estab—
lished companies (outside the regulated industries where special
1See, e.g., Gordon and Malkiel (1979).7
considerations are applicable) are relatively rare,
A more important problem with the Auerbach-BradEord-King
theory is that it is based on the premise that funds can never be
distributed to shareholders in any form other than dividends. This
implicitly precludes the possibili,ty of allowing the company to
be acquired by another firm or using accumulated retained earnings
to repurchase shares. Either of these options permits the
earnings to be taxed as capital gains after a delayJ The theory
that we develop in the present paper explicitly recognizes this
possibility.
A further difficulty with the theory is that any payout rate
is consistent with equilibrium and therefore gives no reason for
the observed stability of the payout rate over time for individual
companies and for the aggregate. Although such stability could
be explained by combining the Auerbach-King-'Bradford model with
some type of signalling explanation, our own analysis based purely
on considerations of risk indicates that the payout rate is deter-
minate and that it is likely to be relatively insensitive to fluc-
tuations in annual earnings.(A more explicit dynamic analysis
would be necessary to confirm this conclusion.)
The most serious problem with the Auerbch-Brdfod-King
hypothesis is the implicit assumption that all shareholders have
1Such infrequent sharerepurchases are very different from a
systematic program of substituting regular repurchases for dlvi—
dends. They do not risk the adverse tax consequence referred to
above and, unlike continuous repurchases in lieu of dividends,
involve a different growth of equity.8
the same tax rates (0 and c). In reality, there is very substarH
tial variation in tax rates and therefore in the value of
p =(1-0)/(l-c)that is compatible with a partial dividend payout.
For individuals in the highest tax bracket, 6 =0,7and the divi-
dend-compatible q i apiroximately 0,i3;1 for tax exempt iPstitutions,
the corresponding value is one. The Auerbach—radfOrd-tcing concept
of shareholder eqUilibrium implies that, anymarket Value of p,
almost all shaehoiders will prefer either no dividends or no
retained earnifigs, depending on whether the tharket Ta1ue of p was
greater thanor less than their own values of the ratio (10)/(l-c).
this condition would cause market segmentation and specialization;
sortie firms would pay no dividend While others would have no
retained earnings and each investor would own shares in Only One
type of firm. Such specialization and market segmentation is
clearly counterfactuai. Our own current atialysis emphasizes the
diveisity of shàrtholder tax rates and shows that this iskey
to understanding the observed policy of substantial and stable
dividends.
In a previous paper with Eytan Sheshinski, we studied the long-
u•n growth equilibrium of an econOmy with corporate and personal
taxes (Feldstein, Green an Sheshinski 197.9).In this context,
dividends appear as the difference between after-tax profits and
the retained earnings that are consjstent With steady-state growth
1This assumes that postponement and the stepped up basis at
death reduce the accrual equivalent capital gains tax to 10 percent.9
and with the optimal debt-equity ratio, This limits aggregate
retained earnings and implies positive aggregate dividends but
does not explain why each firm will choose to pay positive divi-
dends rather than to grow faster than the economy's natural rate.
We suggested that each firm is constrained by the fact that more
rapid growth would increase its relative size, thereby making it
riskier and reducing the market price of its securities. An
explicit model of this relation between size and the "risk—discount"
was not presented in that paper but is one of the basic, ideas of the
general equilibrium analysis that we present here. Unlike the
previous paper, the present analysis will not look at properties
of the long-run steady state but will examine microeconomic choice
in a one period model.
The idea of shareholder risk-aversion as a limit to a firm's
growth and the existence of shareholders in diverse tax situations
are the two central components of the analysis developed, in the
present paper. We consider an economy with two kinds of investors:
taxable individuals and untaxed institutions (like pension funds
and nonprofit organizations).1 Firms can distribute profits
currently as dividends or retain them, grow larger and ultimately
distribute these funds to shareholders as capital gains.2 In the
1The same reasoning would apply if we cQnsider "low tax rate!'
and "high tax rate" individuals. See Feldstein and Slemrod (1978)
for the application of such a classification to analyzing the
effect of the corporate tax systen'i.
future capital gain distribution could be the result of
the firm's shares being acquired by another firm or of a share
repurchase by the firm itself.10
absence of unceraiflty, these assumptions would lead to segrnenta-
tion and specialization. The taxable individuals would invest
only ir firms that pay nb dividends even thouh ceters ibus,
they prefer present dollats to future dollars while untaxed
institutions wOuld inveSt only in firms that retain no prbfits
In this eqüilibrin the share price per dollar of retained earnings
would in general be less than one. This type of equilibium with
segmentation and peoialization is not observed because Of uncertainty.
Because inVeStor regard each firm's return as both unique arid
uncertain, they wish to diversify their investment. We show in
this paper that each firm can in general maximize its share price
by attracfting both types df investors arid that this te4uies a.
dividend policy Of distributing some fraction of earninqs as divi-
dends. Only iri the special case of little o± no uncertainty or of
alimitedability to diVersify risks can the equilibrium beofthe
segmented-market form.
The first section othepaper presents the basic thodel of
dividend behavior in atwo-firmeconomy with two classes of inve-
tors. Some comparative statistics of the resulting equilibrium
are developed in SectiOn 2. The third section examines the special
case in which the two firms have equal expected yields and equal
variances. bespite the diversity of taxpayers, both firms choose
the same dividend rate1 In sectOn 4 the syrunietry of this equil-
ibrium is cntrased with the segrnentation and speciliation
that can arie with riskless investmentS, or with risk4-tieutral
individuals. The fifth section replaces the assumption that there11
are only two firms with a specification of a very large number
of firms of each of two types. The basic results of this large
number case confirm the conclusiors on diversification and divided
policy that were based on the two-firm economy in the earlier
sections of the paper. There is a final concluding section that
suggests direction for further work.12
1.Dividend Behavior in a Two:cy Economy
Our analysiSof corporate dividend behavior uses a simple
one-period thodel. At the beginning of the period, each firm has
one dollar of net profits that must be divided between dividends
arid earnings. The firms announce their dividend policies and
trading then takes place in the shares. The firms use the amounts
that they have retained to make investments in plant and equip-
ment. At the end of the period, the unceitain returns on these
investments are realized and the companies are liquidated. All
of the end-of-period payments are regarded as capital gains rather
than dividends and will be assumed to be untaxed.
There are two kinds of investors in the economy. House-
holds (denoted by a subscript H) are taxed at rate 0 on dividend
income but pay no tax on capital gains. Institutions (denoted
by a subscript I) pay no taxes on either dividends or capital
gains. At the beginning of the period, the two types of inves-
tors own the following numbers of shares in both companies:H1'
SH2F S11ands12, where the subscripts 1 and 2 indicate the
companies. For notational simplicity, we normalize the number of
shares in each company at 1. After the companies announce their
dividend policies, the investors can sell their shares (at prices
determined in the market that depend on the firms' dividend poli-
cies) and can buy other shares. Investors can also place some of
the proceeds of their share sales in a riskiess asset or can
spend those funds on consumption; each dollar invested in this13
risklesE asset has an el-id of period value of 1. We assume however
that investors may not sell hare short. Both types of inves-
tOrs prefer present do1Lars to future dollars; one present dollar
(obtained either as after-tax dividends or from the sale of
shares) is worth R dollars. Althouqh T might be expedted to
differ between households and institutión, we shall assume the
same R fOr both groups.
mach firm has an initial amount of one dollar available for
distributiOn and retention. Company i pays dividend d at the
begJnning of the pe±ibd and therefore invests amount l-d1. The
end-of-period of company i (1=1,2) is r per dollar of funds that
are retained and invested; the rate of reti.tTh oh the fi±m's
capital is thus r1-l.1 The ecpected value of this unOertain return
i r.e and its vaziâhOe is a... The covariance of the retürhs of 1 11
thetwo firms is a12. ]n tha analysis that fol1ois, weconider
thegeneralcase in which the yields and variances are unequäl
We then examine in detail the character of the equilibrium ih
the case in which the meah yields and variances of the two firms
re identical We show that in this situatiOn the degree of uncer-
tainty (as measured by the common variance) and the opportunity
for effective diversification (as measured by the correlation
between the returns) determine whether both companies py
1We assume that firms do not borrow and that the stochastic
return per dollar of investment does not depend on the amount
that is invested.14
dividends and are owned by both types of investors or there is
market segmentation in which one company pays no dividends and
is owned by the household investors.
Our strategy of analysis is as follows. We first derive
the share demand equations for the two types of investors. These
demands depend on the prices of the shares and on their stated
dividend policies. We then use the fact that the available number
of shares of each type of stock is fixed to calculate the price
functions. The price of each type of share depends in general
on the dividend policy of that finn and of the other type of firm.
We assume that firms select the dividend policy that maximizes
the firm's value; i.e., that maximizes the price per share.'
ThiS maximiation yields the optimal dividend for each firm.
when these diVidend va1tie have been obtained, we shall examine
the characteristics of the equilibniu±n and the comarati'ie static
response to óh&rçe in the tax rate.
Investors' Demands for Shares
We derive each investor'. demand funcitions for shares by
maximizing the investor's expected utility subject tothewealth
cofistraint implied by the investor's initial shareholdings and
1MadLmizing the share price is pareto efficient but not
uniquely optima1 There are bther plausible criteria by which
management might in general decide its dividend policy even in a
one period model such as the current one, e.g., majority voting
of the shareholders.15
the equilibrium share prices. We assume that the investors!
utility functions are quadratic and focus our attention on the
role of taxes by assuming that all investors have exactly the
same utility function. The nature of the utility function implies
that the demand for each type of share is independent of the
individual's wealth; we can therefore derive aggregate demand
functions for each type of shareholder by treating all of the
investors of each type as if they were a single investor.
Consider first the investment problem of the households.
If the market equilibrium share prices for the two companies are
p1 and p2, the value of their initial portfolio is ps1 + P2SH2
The initial wealth is exchanged forSl shares of company 1, SH2
shares of company 2, and z dollars of the monetary asset. The
new portfolio must satisfy the wealth constraint:
(1.1) P1SH1 + P2SH2 l5Hl + P2SH2 + ZH.
With dividend payouts of d1 and d2, the households' total
after-tax funds at the beginning of the period are
(l_O)dlsHl
+ (l_O)d2sH2 + z. The additional funds received at the end of
the period are the uncertain amount (l-dl)sHlrl + (l-d2)sH2r2.
Combining these two with each dollar of beginning—of-period funds
equivalent to R dollars of the end-of-period funds yields the
argument of the household's utility function:
(1.2) WH =R(l—O)[SHldl + sH2d2] + RzH + SH1 (l—d1)r1
+ sH2(ld2)r216
The quadratic character of the utility function implies
that expected utility can be written as a linear combination of
the mean and variance of
(1.3) E [U(WH)} =E(WH)
-0.5yvar(WH)
where 1>0 is a measure of risk aversion (and the 0.5 is introduced
to simplify subsequent calculations.) Equation 1.2 implies that
(1.4) E(WH) =R(10)(sHidi +sH2d2)+Rzu+sHl(1_dl)r
2 +sH2(lci2)r2
and
(1.5) var(WH) =s1(1—d1)2a11+s2(l—d2)2G22
+2sHlsH2(l_dl)(l—d2)a12
The households' optimum portfolio is found by maximizing
equation 1.3 subject to the constraint of equation 1.1, The
first-order conditions for maximizing expected utility are:
(1.6) 0 =R(l—O)d1+(1—d1)r
—
Rp1
—
y[SH1(l—d1) a11
+sH2(l—dl)(1—d2)a121
and
1We indicate below the important circumstances under which
the demands implied by this maximization would violate the "no
short sale" constraints. This "limited risk avoidance" case will
be considered explicitly in section 4.17
(1.7) 0 =R(l—e)d2+ (l—d2)r —
Rp2
—
+
sHl(ldl) (1—d2)cY12]
Collectingterms, we may write the households! pair of
demand equations as:
(1-d1)2a11
(1-d1) (l_d2)cl21 SH1
— (1.8)
(1-d1) (1—d2)c12 (l-d2)2o22 ]S
—
[R(l_8)d1
+(1-d1)r
—
Rp1
[R(l_o)d2 + (1-d2)r -Rp2
or, in matrix notation,
(1.9) lAsH =H
-Rp
where the elements of A and are clear from 1.8. If the matrix
A is not singular, 1.8 can be solved for the share demands
It is important to note that A is singular when either stock is
riskiess or when the correlation between the two yields is one;
in either case, holding a mixed portfolio does not achieve any
reduction in risk. The optimal portfolio in this case is an
investment in only one type of stock. More generally, when the
variances are small or the correlation high, the solution of equa-
tion 1.9 may imply demands for shares that violate the constraint
on short—selling. The feasible optimum again requires a special-
ized portfolio and induces extreme dividend behavior in which one
company pays no dividend and the other keeps no retained earnings.18
We return below to examine the characteristics of this "low risk
avoidance" equilibrium. Now however we shall focus on the case
in which A is nonsingular and the solution of equation 1.9 does
not violate the other constraints on portfolio behavior.,1
Solving equation 1,9 yields the households' share demand
equation under the assumption that 0 (i.e,, that short—selling
would not be optimal);
(1.10) =y1A1[a1 —Rp1
Analogous share demand equations hold for the institutional
investors:
—1 —l
(1.11) s1y A [a1—Rp]
The share demands differ only because aH contains the tax variable
(0 >0)while in a1 the tax variable is implicitly zero.2
Price Functions and Optimal Dividends
By equating the share demands of 1,10 and 1.11 to the fixed
share supplies, we can solve for the market clearing share prices
that would correspond to any combination of dividend policies.
Since the number of shares of each company was normalized to one,
1We later show that such equilibria can exist for plausible
parameter values,
21fany of the non-negativity constraints on or are
binding, the optimum is no longer given by equations 1.,1O and 1.1119
we have
(1.12) + =
(1.13)
[1] = + a-
2Rp1
Solving equation 1.13 for this price vector yields:
[R(2-O)d +2(1—cl)rel p—I I -
[R(2-O)d2+ 2(1-d2)rj
- 11+(l-d1)(1—d2)a12
2R
+(l—d1)(l—d2)G12
The price of each type of share is positively related to its own
expected yield and negatively related to the variance of that
yield and its covariance with the yield of the other type of
stock.
We assume that each firm selects its dividend payout rate
to maximize its share price and takes the dividend of the other
firm as given.1 The first order condition for firm 1 is;
1We show in the appendix that the currentpxocess is stable
under this assunption. Section 5 develops a model wLth a large
numberoffirms in which it is more natural to assume that each
firm treats the dividends of other firms as parameters.20
p1 (1.15) =0
LLl
= [R(2—O)—2r+[2(1—d1)a11+(1-d2)cy12]]
and implies that the firm's optimal dividend rate (d1) satisfies:
*2(r—R)+ORa12 (1—d2) (1.16) 1—d1 =__________ — _________
2ya11 2a11
Equation 1.16 describes the first firm's optimal reaction to the
dividend policy of the second firm. Symmetrically we obtain
the dividend policy reactionfunction of the second firm:
*2(r—R)+ORa12(1d1) (1.17) l—c12 =__________ — _________
2ya22 2ci22
If the returns to the investments by the two firms are not
independent (a120), the optimal dividend policy of each firm
depends on the dividend policy of the other firm. The two divi-
dend policy functions can be solved simultaneously to obtain the
equilibrium dividend policy of each firm:
2(r-R)+QR1 a12_________ r* 2a
1—d1 ________ 2ya11 11 L 22
(1.18) I *= 2
[1d2
—2(rR)+OR-_L-2(r-R)+0r( 1122 2'a22 2 a22
The stability of this solutionis verified in an appendix.21
2. Some Comparative Statics
It is immediately clear from equation 1.18 that each firm's
optimal retained earnings depends positively on its own expected
return and negatively on its own variance.1 A higher expected
yield makes it optimal to retain and invest more in the company
while an increase in the uncertainty of that return makes the
immediate payment of dividends more appealing.
If the returns of the two firms are positively correlated
l2 >0),each firm's optimal retained earnings varies inversely
with the attractiveness of investment in the other firm (i.e.,
with the other firm's expected yield and the inverse of its vari-
ance). Intuitively, when retained earnings in one firm are more
attractive and therefore increase, the riskiness of retaining
earnings in the other firm increases if the yields of the two
firms are positively correlated.
The effect of an increase in the rate of tax on dividends is
particularly interesting. For firm 1,
(2.1)
1=- —-1R r1— 2 2y,, I G22 112 1- 1-
4G11a22
The first two terms on the right hand side are unambiguously
1Since c2/G11a22 is thesquare of the correlation coeffi.-
dent between the two yields and therefore necessarily less than
unity, the common multiplier of both terms is positive,22
positive. If the yields of the two firms are uncorrelated
an increase in the tax rate on dividends necessarily reduces the
firm's payout. However, when the yields are correlated the effect
of the tax rate is ambiguous, i.e., the sign of the final term
in equation 2.1 can be either positive or negative. Since
is the regression coefficient of the return for the first firm's
investment on the return for the second firm's investment,1 it
could exceed 2 and make the final expression negative.
It is easy to understand why a strong covariance between
the yields could produce the apparently counterintuitive result
that an increase in the tax rate on dividends can actually raise
a firm's optimal payout. Note first that an equation similar to
2.1 holds for firm 2:
1 R [lG12
(2.2) . . Ii — 22L 11
12
Adding these two expressions gives the effect of an increase in
oonthe total dividends of the two firms combined:
**
(d +d
(2.3) 2 2ya11c2222 11 12
1_i 12
ll22
1This regression coefficient is closely related to the beta
of capital market theory but refers here to the yields expressed
as a return on physical capital rather than share value23
It is easy to show that this is unambiguously negative, This
is clearly so if 012 <O.To see that this is also true when
012 >0,note that the variance of the differencer1 -r2is
022 +011
-
2012;since this is a variance it is necessarily
positive, implying 022 +011
>
2012and therefore that 022 +Gil
-
012
>012
>0.Thus an increase in the tax rate on dividends
unambiguously reduces total dividends. The dividends of one of
the firms may increase but not the dividends of both of them.
The dividends of one firm will increase when the decrease in
the dividends of the other is so large that, given the positive
covariance between the returns, the greater risk associated with
retained earnings in the first firm outweighs the direct effect
of the tax.
It is interesting to consider the magnitude of this sensiti-
vity of the payout policy with respect to the tax parameter.
Equation 1.18 can be used to calculate the elasticity of the
aggregate retained earnings with respect to 0. Although it is
easy to obtain a general expression, the interpretation of the
elasticity is clearer if we assume that the "excess yield"
(re -R)is the same for both assets.1 With this assumption,
equation 1.18 implies the elasticity
1When the excess returns differ for thetwo firms, re_,R is
replaced by a weighted average including the variances and covar—
iances of the yields.24
B (2_d1*_d2*)—__________ (2.4)
2-d1-d2
—
2(r-R)+QR
In the special case in which the expected yield is equal to the
yield on the riskless asset (i,e., re=R), there are retained
earnings only because of the tax effect and the elasticity of the
retained earnings with respect to the dividend tax rate is unity.
When there is a positive expected excess return on retained
earnings, the tax effect is less important and the elasticity is
less than one.1
an early empirical study of the effect oe taxes on the
dividend policy of British firms, Feldstein (1970) estimated that
the elasticity of the dividend rate with respect to the inverse
of 0 was 0.9. Since dividends were about two—thirds of retained
earnings in that sample period, the estimated elasticity of 0.9
corresponds to an elasticity of retained earnings with respect
to 0 of approximately 0.6, and istherefore quite compatible with
equation 2.4.25
3. Characteristics of the Symmetric Equilibrium
The special case in which the two firms have equal expected
yields and equal variances is particularly interesting to analyze.
Together with the assumptions that we have made about the similar-
ity of the two types of investors, this assumption about the firm
implies that the only essential source of difference in the model
is in the different tax treatments of households and institutions.
We commented in the introduction, and show formally in section 4
below, that when the advantage of diversification is small (i.e.,
low risk or high correlation) this difference in taxation leads
to specialization of ownership and corner solutions for the
firms' dividend policies, L,e., the firm that remains in business
pays no dividend. We now examine the characteristics of the
equilibrium in the case in which there is sufficient risk and
opportunity for diversification and show that in this case both
firms do pay dividends. The opportunity for advantageous
sification by investors induces positive dividends by firms.
With r1e= r2e anda11 =a22equation 1.18 shows immediately
that d1 =d2
,i.e.,both firms have the same optimal dividend.
In contrast to the "no diversification" case in which the dividend
policies are at opposite extremes, advantageous diversification
produces identical dividend policies. This common dividend
policy satisfies:
(3.1) 1 —d=2(re_R)+OR
ya(2+p)26
where re is the common expected yield, a is the common variance,
and p is the correlation between the yields.1
e *
Note first that 6 =0and r =Rtogether imply d =1;when
there is no tax on dividends and no "excess return" on funds
retained in the firm, all profits will be paid out. The economic
reason for this is clear: with no tax or yield incentive for
retention, full payout avoids the risk of retained earnings without
any loss in after-tax yield.
*
A small tax on dividends clearly makes l-d > 0 and there-
*
fore d < 1, i.e., both firms pay out some but not all of their
profits as dividends. A positive but partial dividend payout is
clearly optimal despite a tax that discriminates against divi-
*> dends. Of course, a large enough value of 0 can make l—d -1
*
and therefore imply d =0;when the tax discrimination against
dividends is strong enough, no dividends will be paid. Note
that the excess return on retained earnings affects the optimal
dividends in the same way as the dividend tax. Starting at 0 =0
e e and r =R,a small increase in r will cause positive but partial
dividend payout while a large enough excess return on retained
1WithGfl =a22,p = = G12/a11. Equation3.1
follows directly from 1.18 when it is noted2that the common mul-
tiplier in 1.18 is the inverse of 1 -(p/2)and that 1 —
1-(p/2);the ratio of these two is the inverse of 1 + (p/2).27
earnings will cause all dividends to stop.1
Consider next the price per share that prevails in this case
when both firms adopt the optimal dividend policy. This share
price is the value that investors place on the initial dollar of
available profits inside the firm.2 Since dollars
is tempting to ask what happens as p tends to unity.
When p =1,there is no opportunity for diversification. The
economics implies that in this case there will be specialization
of ownership and therefore of dividend policy. This cannot be
seen by setting p =1in equation 3.1 because equation 3.1 does
not hold when p =1.When p =1,the matrix A of equation 1.9 is
singular and the share demand equations (1.10 and 1.11) from
which 3.1 is derived do not hold.
2There is an extensive literature on this value, which is
sometimes referred to as "Tobin's q." It has been common to
assume that the equilibrium value of q is one, an assumption that
we accepted in Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski (1979). Auerbach
(1979), Bradford (1979) and King (1977) analyze a model without
uncertainty and with only taxable shareholders; they conclude
that if firms are paying positive but partial dividends, the
share price must equal 1 -0,i.e.,a dollar of profits inside
the firm must be valued at the amount that can be paid net of tax
to the shareholder. (Their analysis also allows for a tax on
capital gains; which also influences the share price; in the
absence of this' tax their share price formula reduces to 1—0.)
Studies using the capital asset pricing model to measure the value
of a marginal dollar inside the firm produce estimates that vary
substantially over time with an average that is in the range of
unity or somewhat less; see Gordon and Bradford (1979) and the
studies that they cite. Green (1979) shows that changes in share
prices on their ex dividend days cannot be used to estimate the
value of a marginal dollar of funds inside the firm.28
retained in the firms have equal expected yields and equal vari-
ances, their share prices must also be equal. Equation 1.14
confirms this and shows that the common price is:
(3.2) p =R1[(l-0/2)dR + (l_d)re —y(l-d)2a(l+p)]
The three terms on the right hand side of 3.2 show that the price
depends on the net-of-tax value of the current dividend [(l-0/2)d],
the expected present value of the retained earnings [ (l_d)reR]l,
and the offsetfor the risk associated with the retained
2 —l
earnings [y(1-d) a(l÷p)]R .Substituting the optimal value of the
dividend payout rate from equation 3.1 and rearranging terms
yields:
0 *2
22R
or
(3.4) p =1-0+[re_ R + R0/212
2
2Ryo(l+p/2)2
Since half of the shareholders pay tax at rate 0 while half
pay no tax, the average tax rate is 0,12 and 1 —0/2is the net-of-
tax income per dollar of dividends. Equation 3.3 shows that when
* itis optimal to pay out all profits as dividends (d =1),the
share price equals the net-of-tax value of the dividend,1 More
1This special case thus corresponds to the Auerbach—Bradford—
King share price equation extended to the case of heterogeneous
taxpayers. It holds however only when all profits are paid as
dividends by both firms.29
generally, when the firms retain some of their earnings, the
price per share exceeds the net-of-tax amount that could be
distributed. This is shown clearly in equation 3.3. The equi-
valent expression in equation 3.4 indicates why this is so. Since
it is optimal for a firm to retain some of its earnings when the
returns inside the firm exceed their opportunity cost or when
there is a tax penalty on dividends, either of these reasons to
limit dividends causes an increase in the share price vis—a—vis
*
theprice that would prevail if d =1.This is seen explicitly
in equation 3.4. To the extent that there is an excess return on
retained earnings (re >R)or that the average tax rate on divi-
dends is positive (0/2 >0),the price exceeds the net amount
that could be distributed. An increase in risk aversion (y) or
in the riskiness of retained earnings (a(l÷p/2)) decreases the
magnitude of this premium.
It is certainly interesting to note that the price per dollar
of earnings inside the firm may be less than, equal to or greater
*
thanunity. When d =1,the price is clearly less than 1. A
high value of excess return can of course produce a share value
greater than one. But even if re =R,the price lies between
1 -0/2and 1.1
1 e *
Clearlywhen r R and d 0, the value of the firm is
the discountal expected value of the subsequent payout (re/R =1)
minus any adjustment for risk. When re =Rbut d* >0,p lies
between this upper bound and 1 -0/2.30
Our discussion in this section has implicitly assumed that
the investors hold both assets in an optimal portfolio but this
has not been formally demonstrated. Consider therefore the share
demand equations 1.10 and 1.11. In the symmetric case of r =r
and d1 =d2,the two elements of are equal, Moreover,
G11= a22implies that A is symmetric and therefore that A1 is
symmetric. This implies that SH1 =5H2'The value of SH1 is
easily shown to be
—R(1-O)d+(ld)re (3.5) SH1
ya11 (l+p)
which is clearly greater than zero, Thus5H1 =SH2
>0and there
is diversification by households. A similar derivation shows
s11 =S12
>0,which implies both that institutional investors
diversify and that neither group demands 100 percent of the shares
of any firm.
A Numerical Example
To conclude this analysis of the case in which the opportunity
for advantageous diversification causes nonspecialization and
positive but partial dividend payout, it is useful to present a
numerical example in which these properties hold, Consider the
case in which the expected return on investment in both firms is
re =1.3and the correlation between the return is P= 05. Let
the tax rate be 0= 0.5 and the riskless yield on the alternative
asset be R =1.1.The common variance of thereturns does not31
matter as such, only the product of the variance and the risk
aversion coefficient (yq). The dividend payout rate (d) and the
combined risk parameter (ya) must satisfy the dividend payout
condition (equation 3.1) and the condition that the demand for
shares by households and institutions (given by equations 1.10 and
1.11) together equal unity for each firm and separately do not
violate the condition that investors may not sell short. The
symmetry of the current problem implies that each type of inves-
tor will hold equal amounts of both types of shares. These
conditions are satisfied if the dividend payout rate is d =0.8
and therisk parameter is ya= 1.87. Equation 3.3 implies that the
corresponding price per share is p =0.79.32
4. T ented Market Equi libri urn
We have been analyzing the case in which firms are icten—
tical but in which there is enough opportunity for advantageous
diversification to cause investors to hold mixed portfolios.
Firms pay out positive dividends in a value-maximizing equil-
ibrium. Qualitatively, these results are not surprising. It is how-
ever somewhat odd that the equilibrium of our model in the
symmetric case is itself symmetric: both firms choose the
same dividend payout rate and each investor holds an equal
share in the two firms. The conflict between diversification
and tax-avoidance is completely resolved in favor of the former.
One might have thought that the firms would "locate" at different
points in the dividend spectrum attracting a different clien-
tele, one more heavily taxed on average than the other, and
that investors would accept this incomplete diversification
in equilibrium in order to reap the tax advantages.
At present we do not know whether this striking symmetry
property is the result of the mean-variance utility, the "two
class" model of investors, or whether it is a phenomenon of
more fundamental generality.(The next section will show,
however, that it persists with competitive as well as duopolis-
tic behavior by firms).
In this section we will show that this symmetric equilibrium,
which is unique whenever investors are holding shares of both
firms, coexists with asymmetric "locational" equilibria when33
the non-negativity conditions for portfolios are binding. Such a
situation arises when there is little variance in yields or a
high correlation between the two firms so that diversification
is of only limited benefit.
The phenomenon of asymmetric, segmented market equilibrium
is seen most clearly in the extreme case of certainty: a] =a22
=0.
This lack of risk implies that each investor values shares
at the present value of their payouts, net of taxes. For
either firm, one dollar paid as dividends is worth (l—O)R to
households and R to institutions; while one dollar of retained
earnings is worth r to both types of investors.
Consider the case in which R >re>R(l-o),i.e.,in which
funds inside the firm have a lower yield than outside the firm
(R >re)but are worth more than funds outside the firm if a
dividend tax has to be paid (re >(1-e)R))In this case, the
untaxed institutional investor prefers immediate payout (d1)
because the value of the dividend (R) exceeds the expected
value of the funds left in the company (re) .Incontrast,
the taxed household investor prefers no dividend payout (d=O)
because the value of the net-of—tax dividend ((1-o)R) is less
that the expected value of the funds left in the company (re).
The market will accomodate this conflict of preferences by
specialization of ownership and dividend policies.
1The alternative case of re> R, both investors will prefer to
have no dividends and both firms will therefore choose d0, The
firms behave identically and there is no market sequentatiOn.34
Let us examine the equilibrium prices that would lead to
=0,d =1,with portfoliosSH1 =1,S12
=0,S11
=0,
s12 =1.First, it is clear, that unless the initial ownership
of shares gives the two classes equal portfolio wealth, the
equilibrium prices of the two firms may not be equal. This is
not incompatible with the value maximizing assumption because
the firm cannot achieve the other's value by mimicking its
dividend policy. Both values will change in this process.
We will show that the equilibrium prices are given by
-l e p1=R r
(4.1)
E[(1—a),1]
where the precise value of p2 in this interval is determined in
such a way that the portfolios described above are compatible
with the budget equation 1.1. For households to hold shares
of firm 1 in positive quantity we need p1Rlreand if they
don't hold firm 2, then p2 1-a. Similarly,the implications
that can be derived from institutions' portfolios are p2 1,
>—le
p1 =RrCombining these we see that 4.1 is required.
To verify that. these prices are indeed equilibria, it is
necessary to see what changes would be induced by different
dividend policies. This problem is a little curious in that
even if dividends were to vary, the same prices and the same
portfolios could still persist. Thus the equilibrium sustained
by extreme dividend policies is compatible with value-maximi-
zation only in the sense that firms are indifferent to these choices.35
Itis of interest to note that the symmetric equi1ibriun
d1 =d2
=0and p1 =p2
=Rreis also an equilibrium here.'
The paradox of symmetric vs. segmented equilibria is resolved
bynoting that the latter are produced when the non-negativity
constraints for portfolios are binding.
Moreover one can observe that since no taxes are actually
collectedin either of these cases,the consumption patterns,
and hence welfare considerations are identical.
The results of the riskiess case can be extended to the
case of small variance or high correlation without changing
the essential conclusion. In such cases, the share demands
implied by equations 1.10 and 1.11 would violate the no short-
selling constraint. The constrained optimum would involife a
corner solution in which ownership is specialized. The dividend
policy of each company would then be adjusted to the tax
situation of its homogeneous group of shareholders. The lack
of such homogeneity and the presence of dividends for the
majority of major publicly owned companies suggest that the
opportunities for advantageous diversification are sufficient
to prevent shareholder specialization.2
1
Anyshareownership will sustain this, and individuals will be
indifferent.
2Other possibilities include a non-homogeneity of beliefs which
are not perfectly correlated with tax status, locked-in investors
due to the taxation of capital gains on realization, or inter-
temporal onsiderations which are of practical importance but are
difficult to model.36
5. The Many-Firm Case
The analysis above has been cast entirely in duopolistic
terms. Each firm, contemplating a change in its dividend
policy, is altering the entire pattern of returns available to
investors in a significant way. A more "competitive" view of
the asset market would entail many firms, each of which is
such a small part of the portfolio of the average investor that
its dividend policy has only a marginal effect on the set of
attainable mean—variance pairs. We shall show that the main
results of the two-firm model, including all of the qualitative
characteristics of the symmetric equilibria on which we have
concentrated, remain valid in the many—firm case. Some modifi-
cations of the comparative statics will arise.
Our approach to the many firm case will be asymptotic.
That is, we will consider the equilibrium of an economy with a
large finite number of firms and will analyze the behavior of
the model as this number increases. The reason for this
methodology is conceptual as well as mathematical. If we were
to deal immediately with the idealized case of a continuum of
firms whose returns were all infinitesimal, the effect of any
one firm's dividend policy on the attainable set would be
literally zero,' and its value would therefore be a constant.
There is the additional mathematical problem that it is impos-
sible to have a continuum of random variables that are mutually
independent; thus such a model would be ill—specified from the
hecTinning.37
Without a genuine solution to the value—maximization problem,
our model has no motive force. On the other hand, if we were to con-
sider the characteristics of each firm as fixed, and increase
the number of firms and the number of investors at the same
rate, the central limit theorem tells us that each investor
will be able to achieve a riskless portfolio in the limit.
Therefore, in order to preserve both a non—degenerate attain-
able set of portfolios for the investor and a non-trivial
value—maximization problem for the firms, it is necessary to
think of a sequence of economies in which the firm-specific
variances are growing at the same rate as the number of firms
and the number of investors.(The fraction of each firm
initially owned by each investor will thus be decreasing at
the square of this rate.)
Let there be N firms of each of two types, denoted 1
and 2 as above. The return to firm i per dollar of retained
earnings is given by the sum of two random variables
r. =x.+ x
1 1
where x is a firm specific return which is independent over
all firms both within a type and across types, and x is a
common return affecting all firms of both types. Moreover
all the x1ts are independent of x.
We assume that the variance of x1 is equal to Nt1 for
all firms of type 1, and NT2 for all firms of type 2. The
means of x are denoted and 2 respectively. The common
comonent has meanand variance r0.38
We will study the equilibria of this model which have
the characteristic that all the firms within each type
are choosing the identical dividend policy. To compute the
behavior of a single firm of type 1, we hypothesize a given
dividend policy, d1 ,commonto the N-i other firms of type 1,
and a policy, d2 ,commonto the N firms of type 2. Then, by
varying the dividend policy of the firm in question, we max-
imize its value in a manner completely analogous to that in
Section 1.
An equilibrium is a pair (d1,d2) such that d is the
optimal policy for a firm of type j given that the 2N—l other
firms act in the indicated way.
It follows from the symmetry of the actions hypothesized
that any optimal portfolio consists of equal ownership shares
in all of the firms of a given type that are choosing a common
dividend policy. Thus the three relevant random variables for
portfolio choice are r, the return to the type 1 firm in question;
=Err,where the summation runs over all firms of type 1
except this one; and r2 =Er.,where the summation runs over
all firms of type 2. Under our assumptions, the variances and
covariances are given by
var r =NT1+T
1 var r =N(N-l)T1+(N-1)t0
2 2 var r. =NT2+ NT0
1 coy r,r =(N—l)i0
coy r,r2 =NT0 12 coy r ,r =N(N—l)T039
Consider a taxable investor, H. LetSHI sHl s112 be
the ownership shares he holds in each of the three categories
of firms. Let p, p1, p2 be the prices of the shares of these
three groups of firms. Writing the investor's objective
function as in 1.3 ,thefirst—order conditions for his
problem are expressed as
where
(5H
yBSH1
\S
(bH \\
bHi
—
p1
\\bH2 :1
(1-d) (1-d2)Nt0
(1—d1) (1—d2)N(N—1)t0
(1-d2)
2
(N2t2+Nt0) J
Asabove, we find the induced equilibrium prices for the assets
by solving the equation
B=
(1—d)2(Nt1+t0)
(1-d)(1-d1) (N-l)T0
(1—d)(i—d2)Nr0
(i—d) (1—d1) (N—1)T0
(1—d1)
2
(N (N—i) T1+ (N—i)
(i—d1) (1—d2)N(N—i) T0
bHR(1-O)d + (1_d)j
bHl =R(i—o)(N—1)d1 + (i—d1) (N—1)x1
b2 =R(i-o)Nd2+ (i-d2)N2
(5.1)1 1
H
(N5H+NsI \\\\ =
(NsH1+NsIl
Ns+Ns
-—
bHl + b11
bH2 + b12
—2R p1
240
for the prices, where the subscript I is the analogous quantity
for institutions (i.e. setting e.= 0).
We are interested in the behavior of the optimum d, given
d1 and d2, for large values of N. Taking the derivative of the
solution for p from 5.1 with respect to d and letting N go to
infinity, we find that the limiting value of d satisfies
(5.2) l_d* =[(l—d)T+(1—d )T —R(2—6)+
10 20 21T1 111
Interchanging 1 and 2 a similar formula applies to type 2
firms optimal dividend policy.
To find an equilibrium, set d* =d1in 5.2 and,
in the analogous expression for type 2, set d* =d2.Solving
for d1 and d2 we find that
T0/2T1 71 R(2 )T0/21122-R(2-o)
(5.3) (l—d1) (1 + i+T0/2T2 =x- —e
l+T0/2T22112
and similarly for type 2.
If T0=0,so that all firms' returns are independent, we
get
1 d —21—R(2—O)
1 2111
The conditions for an interior optimum for the firi 1 >d1
>0
are
111 >
—R(1—0/2) >041
The right hand inequality is satisfied as long as exceeds
R; the left hand inequality requires that the uncertainty in
returns not be too small, or else the firm will want to retain
everything. This is analogous to 1.18.42
6. Comparative Statics of the Many Firm Case
As in the case of duopoly, the retention rate of firms of
a given type is increasing in the mean return, decreasing in the
variance of return and decreasing in R, the relative attractive-
ness of the alternative asset. Because we have modeled the
returns across firms as having a common component, they are
necessarily positively correlated. The negative influence
of the other type's mean payout, and the positive influence of
its firm—specific variance which was a characteristic of the
two—firm model whenever >0,is also preserved.
One difference between the two models concerns the potential
for a positive effect of the tax rate on the retentions of any
firm. Recall that in 2.1 it was shown that if the regression
coefficient of firm l's returns on firm 2's returns exceeds ,
thenthis apparently perverse phenomenon would hold. From
equation 5•3wesee that
(l—d1) R T0 — —
2y-r1
(1— >0
It follows, a fortiori, that the aggregate retention rate
rises in response to increased dividend taxation.
One might believe that this result is due to our implicit
assumption that the regression coefficient of one firm's
returns on that of any other is necessarily less than one
(T0/10+ wherejisthe type of firm in question). This is43
not true. Suppose that the model were generalized slightly
so that the returns to firms of type one were
r. =x.+ Kx
1 1
Ki0 F Theregressionof type 1 on type 2 returns is T +T
or
01
K sufficiently large this exceeds 2, the critical value beyond
which increased taxation leads to firm l's decreased reten-
tions in the duopolistic model. In the many firmcase, however,
the equation analogous to 1.18 is
2
(l-d1)[1 +
2T1K
-
4TjT2+To/21
—22
—R(2—e) 1
12 T 2
+2F1 —R(2—O)
2yT1K2
Since this is a linear equation for the retention rate, its
derivative with respect to 0 is just the derivative of the
right hand side, divided by the bracketed expression on the
left. The latter can be negative when K is large and is
small, suggesting the potential for a negative, perverse
dependence here as well. This is not possible, however, because
retentions wouldthemselves have to beneqative in such a case. We would
really bein the cornersolution where everything ispaidout.In summary, thecm-
petitive modelhas the property that wherever there are some
retentionsin equilibrium they will increase in magnitude when44
dividends are taxed more heavily. This is in contrast to 2.1
where a high variance of firm l's return and a high covariance
could produce a reduction in retentions downward from a positive
equilibrium level.
In the symmetric case, where the means and variances are the
same for the two types of firms, the same formula as 2.4 applies
for the elasticity of aggregate retentions with respect to the
tax rate. This is a further rough confirmation of the applica-
bility of this model to the empirical results mentioned above
in footnote 1, p. 24.45
7. Conclusion
This paper has provided a simple model of market equilibrium
to explain why firms that maximize the value of their shares pay
dividends even though the funds could instead be retained and
subsequently distributed to shareholders in a way that would allow
them to be taxed more favorably as capital gains. Our explanation
does not rely on any assymetry of information or divergence of
interests between management and shareholders. The heterogeneity
of tax rates and the existence of uncertainty and of risk aversion
are explicitly recognized. Indeed, it is the combination of the
conflicting preferences of shareholders in different tax brackets
and their desire for portfolio diversification in the face of
uncertainty that together cause all firms to pay dividends in our
model.
The very simple framework that we have used here should be
extended in several directions. The possibility of borrowing by
corporations and investors should be specifically recognized. An
explicit multiperiod analysis with growing capital stocks should
be developed. The relationship between each corporation's rate
of investment and its equilibrium rate of return can be examined
in thts extended framework.
The present study indicates that the existing tax treatment
of dividends distorts corporate financial dividends and may cause
a misallocation of total investment. It will be important to
see whether these adverse effects remain in the more general
analytic framework.46
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App€fldix
We verify the stability of the equilibrium defind in l.1B by
examining the reaction fUnctions in 1.16 and 1q17. Note that
dd1-__ -
2cl
dd2 12
—.2c
If we linearize the adjustment process
d (di)
/al 0\ /4 - d\
d2 =(oa2)d;_d2)
(where a and are arbitrary positive speed of adjUstment oef-
ficients) around the equilibrium, we are lead o examine the
a12
a22
in which the trace (-(a1+cx2)) is clearly negative nd the
2
determinant (a1a2 (1- a12—)) isclearly pOsitive. Thérefoié
4a11a22
the system is locally stable.
1 —a1